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ABSTRACT
With rise of machine learning (ML) and the proliferation of smart
mobile devices, recent years have witnessed a surge of interest
in performing ML in wireless edge networks. In this paper, we
consider the problem of jointly improving data privacy and com-
munication efficiency of distributed edge learning, both of which
are critical performance metrics in wireless edge network com-
puting. Toward this end, we propose a new decentralized stochas-
tic gradient method with sparse differential Gaussian-masked sto-
chastic gradients (SDM-DSGD) for non-convex distributed edge
learning. Our main contributions are three-fold: i) We propose a
generalized differential-coded DSGD update, which enable a much
lower transmit probability for gradient sparsification, and provide
an O˜(1/√NT ) convergence rate; ii) We theoretically establish the
privacy and communication efficiency performance guarantee for
our SDM-DSGD method, which outperforms all existing works;
and iii) We reveal theoretical insights and offer practical design
guidelines for the interactions between privacy preservation and
communication efficiency, two conflicting performance goals. We
conduct extensive experiments with a variety of learning models
onMNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets to verify our theoretical findings.
Collectively, our results contribute to the theory and algorithm de-
sign for distributed edge learning.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing methodologies→ Distributed algorithms; Ma-
chine learning; • Security and privacy; • Networks → Network
performance analysis;
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1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, advances in machine learning (ML) have enabled
many new and emerging applications that transform human lives.
Traditionally, the training of ofML applications often rely on cloud-
based data-centers to collect and process vast amount of data.With
the proliferation of smartmobile devices and IoT (Internet-of-Things),
data and requests for ML are increasingly being generated by de-
vices from wireless edge networks. Due to high latency, low band-
width, and privacy concerns1, collecting all data to the cloud for
processing may no longer be feasible or desirable. Therefore, the
hope of “ML at the wireless edge” (“edge ML” for short) is to re-
tain data in wireless edge networks and perform ML training dis-
tributively across end-user devices and edge servers (or called edge
clouds). By doing so, one could potentially improve edge ML train-
ing performance while ensuring user privacy.
However, the successful deployment of edge ML faces signifi-
cant technical hurdles. During the execution of distributed edge
ML algorithms, each node in the network needs to exchange in-
formation with its local neighbors, which often injects intensive
communication load into the network. This problem is further ex-
acerbated by the inherent capacity constraints of wireless chan-
nels (due to channel fading, interference, etc.) and edge devices
(due to limits in transmitter power, receiver sensitivity, etc.). More-
over, merely keeping data at edge devices does not ensure privacy:
the released local messages that are exchanged over the air dur-
ing each iteration of the algorithm still allow adversaries to infer
the local sensitive data [1, 3, 9, 28]. Indeed, existing ML algorithms
have not been designed for the edge environments. Hence, there is
a pressing need for a fundamental understanding on how to design
distributed algorithms to ensure both communication-efficient and
privacy-preserving edge ML under severe communication and pri-
vacy constraints.
Unfortunately, the design of private and communication-efficient
edge ML training faces two inherently conflicting challenges: i)
On one hand, to preserve users’ privacy while ensuring training
convergence, one often needs to inject certain unbiased i.i.d. (in-
dependent and identically distributed) random noise into the ex-
changed information. However, the privacy guarantee with i.i.d.
noise typically degrades with the number of training iterations
T [1, 9, 22, 29]. Hence, for a given privacy constraint, there exists a
1Data privacy concerns in designing decentralized learning algorithms have long been
raised in the literature (see, e.g., [3, 9, 28]). This is because in many applications (e.g.,
healthcare, finance, recommendation systems, etc.), ML models are usually trained by
data over distributed systems that contain users’ privacy information.
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maximum value ofT that a distributed edgeML training algorithm
can run; ii) On the other hand, to design communication-efficient
distributed edgeML algorithms, it is necessary to perform gradient
sparsification and/or compression (see, e.g., [18, 20, 21, 25]). How-
ever, as we show later, these operations induce a different type of
random noise, which increases the the value of T for achieving
some desired training loss while providing no privacy guarantee.
It is highly challenging to reconcile these two conflicting types of
randomness in distributed edge ML algorithmic design.
To date, results on edgeMLalgorithmic designs that are both pri-
vate and communication-efficient remain rather limited. Most of
the existing work focus on either communication efficiency [17, 21,
30] or data privacy [4, 13]. For the limited amount of work that con-
sidered both, they are either only restricted to the server/worker ar-
chitecture or having unsatisfactory performances and high imple-
mentation complexity (see Section 2 for more in-depth discussion).
The above limitations of the existing work motivate us to propose
a new decentralized stochastic gradient descent (DSGD) method
with sparse differential Gaussian-masked stochastic gradients. For
convenience, we refer to this method as SDM-DSGD. Our SDM-
DSGD method addresses the aforementioned technical challenges
and offer significantly improved privacy and communication effi-
ciency performances. Our main results and their significance are
summarized as follows:
• We propose a SDM-DSGD method for non-convex distributed
edgeML training, which is differentially-private, communication-
efficient, and applicable for general network topologies.We show
that, with the properly chosen parameters, our SDM-DSGD algo-
rithm is (ϵ, δ )-differentially private (DP) and enjoys an O˜(1/√NT )
convergence rate, where N is the number of nodes in the net-
work and T is the final iteration index of the algorithm. More-
over, we show that the maximum value of T scales as O(m4),
wherem is the size of local dataset at each node2.
• It is also worth pointing out that our SDM-DSGD is a generalized
differential-coded DSGD approach in the sense that:All existing
differential-coded DSGD algorithms can be seen as a special case
of our SDM-DSGD (e.g., [21]). Specifically, our key updating step
in SDM-DSGD is a linear combination of the current state and
the standard DSGD update. Remarkably, with this generalized
updating step, one can perform gradient sparsification with a
much lower transmit probability p, which implies significantly
improved privacy. This also relaxes the restricted constraint in
[21] on finding a “valid” p. We also note that, thanks to this new
algorithmic structure, the non-private version of our algorithm
(i.e., no Gaussian-masking) may be of independent interest.
• Based on our theoretical results from SDM-DSGD, we go one-
step further to investigate the interactions between i) gradient
differential sparsification and ii) Gaussian masking, which are
the two key components responsible for communication effi-
ciency and privacy in SDM-DSGD, respectively. Toward this end,
we compare an alternative design that also has the same two
components but with their order being reversed. Our analysis
shows that the proposed SDM-DSGD scheme is superior and can
reduce the privacy budget by ap2-fraction. This insight deepens
2Our algorithms can straightfowardly be extended to cases with datasets having un-
balanced sizes, i.e.,mn1 ,mn2 for n1 , n2 .
our understanding on these two components and offers algorith-
mic design guidelines in practice.
• Lastly, we conduct extensive experiments to examine the per-
formance of our SDM-DSGD algorithm with a variety of deep
learning models on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. Our experi-
ments show that the accuracy of SDM-DSGD outperforms two
state-of the-art decentralized learning algorithms [12, 21] under
the same communication cost and privacy budget. These exper-
iments corroborate our theoretical results.
Collectively, our results in this paper contribute to the state
of the art of theories and algorithm design for communication-
efficient and privacy-preserving decentralized learning. The rest
of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3, we will review
necessary background for our algorithm design and analysis. In
Section 4, we introduce our SDM-DSGD algorithm and then an-
alyze its performances in privacy and convergence. Numerical re-
sults are provided in Section 5. In Section 6, we provide concluding
remarks.
2 RELATED WORK
As mentioned in Section 1, results on private and communication-
efficient distributed learning algorithms remain quite limited in the
literature. For example, to achieve both communication efficiency
and differential privacy, Agarwal et al. [2] proposed the cpSGD al-
gorithmbased on the randomized quantization and Binomial mask-
ing. It is shown both theoretically and experimentally that Bino-
mial masking achieves nearly the same utility as Gaussian mask-
ing, while the communication cost is significantly reduced. How-
ever, this work mainly focused on the distributed mean estimation
(DME) problem under the server/worker architecture. It remains
unclear how to implement the cpSGD algorithm to train general
deep learning models in networks with general communication
topologies. Another related work is [3], where Cheng et al. pro-
posed a new decentralized algorithm named leader-follower elastic
averaging stochastic gradient descent (LEASGD). In the LEASGD
algorithm, the computationnodes are dynamically categorized into
two pools: leader pool with nodes of lower loss values and fol-
lower pool with nodes of higher loss. In each iteration, the leader
nodes will pair with followers to guide the followers in the right
direction. Gaussian masking was adopted in the communication
step to protect the data privacy. Although this work numerically
showed LEASGD’s communication efficiency, the implementation
complexity of LEASGD is high due to the categorization and lead-
follower pairing in each iteration. Also, the theoretical performance
of LEASGD is unclear under the non-convex cases. In contrast to
these existing work, in this paper we propose a communication-
efficient and privacy-preserving distributed training algorithm named
SDM-DSGD, for distributed nonconvex learning. Our SDM-DSGD
algorithm can be viewed as a variant of state-of-the-art decentral-
ized learning algorithm DSGD [12] by introducing the randomized
sparification and the Gaussian mechanism.
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3 DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY AND GRADIENT
SPARSIFICATION: A PRIMER
To facilitate subsequent technical discussions on privacy and com-
munication efficiency, in this section, we provide the necessary
background on differential privacy and gradient sparsification.
1) Differential Privacy: Differential privacy (DP) [5, 7] is a
canonical privacy metric for the privacy-preserving data analysis.
Under the DP framework, privacy is defined and measured by how
noticeable the distribution of the outcome of some query mecha-
nism changes when only one sample in the dataset is changed:
Definition 1 ((ϵ, δ )-Differential Privacy [5]). Two datasets
D andD′ are said to be adjacent if and only if they differ by only one
element. Given two adjacent N -element datasets D and D′ ∈ DN
and ϵ, δ > 0, a randomized query mechanism M : DN → Rd is
called (ϵ, δ )-differentially-private ((ϵ, δ )-DP) if and only if for any
measurable set E ∈ Rd , the output of M satisfies P(M(D) ∈ E) ≤
eϵP(M(D′) ∈ E) + δ .
In the literature, two popular approaches to achieve DP are the
so-called Gaussian and Laplacian masking mechanisms, both of
which share the same form: M(D) = q(D) + η, where q(·) is a
query function and η is the injected Gaussian or Laplacian masking
noise. In our work, we focus on the Gaussian masking mechanism.
2) Sparsification: In the literature, sparsification, also known
as sparse compression, is a commonly used compression technique
for compressing gradients to design communication-efficient dis-
tributed learning algorithms [20, 21, 25]. The key idea of sparsifica-
tion is to apply the the following Bernoulli randomized operation
to sparsify a high-dimensional vector:
Definition 2 (Sparsifier [25]). For any vector x = [x1, · · · ,xd ]⊤ ∈
R
d and a constant p ∈ [0, 1), S(x) outputs a sparse vector with the
i-th element [S(x)]i following the Bernoulli(p) distribution:{
Pr([S(x)]i = xip ) = p,
Pr([S(x)]i = 0) = 1 − p.
We can see that the sparsifier operation randomly selects some
coordinates and sets the information in these coordinates to zero.
Also, it follows immediately from Definition 2 that the sparsifica-
tion operation is unbiased and the introduced variance depends on
the magnitude of input vector (we omit the proof due to its sim-
plicity):
Lemma 1. For any x ∈ Rd , the random output S(x) satisfies: 1)
unbiased expectation: E
(
S(x)) = x; and 2) input-dependent variance:
Var
(
S(x)) = (1/p − 1)‖x‖2.
It isworth noting that, although sparsification is a randommech-
anism, it does not provide any privacy guarantee in terms of DP:
Given a dataset D and a query function q(·), there exists an adja-
cent dataset D′ such that q(D) , q(D′). Under the sparsification
with probability p, consider the event E = {q(D)/p}. Then, for
dataset D, to have the output q(D)/p, it requires that all the coor-
dinates need to be selected. Thus, it holds that Pr(S(q(D) ∈ E) =
pd > 0, where d is the dimension. However, for dataset D′, be-
cause q(D) , q(D′), it is impossible to have an output as q(D)/p,
which implies Pr(S(q(D′) ∈ E) = 0. Thus, it is impossible to find
valid ϵ and δ ∈ [0, 1) to satisfy the DP inequality in Definition
1. Interestingly, although sparsification does not offer DP, we will
show it later that by sparsifying part of the original information,
the sparsifier operation does help to improve the privacy protec-
tion performance.
4 A SPARSE DIFFERENTIAL GAUSSIAN-
MASKING SGD APPROACH
In this section, we first present the problem formulation of edgeML
training in Section 4.1. Then, we will present our SDG-DSGD algo-
rithm in Section 4.2 and its main theoretical results in Section 4.3.
4.1 Problem Formulation of Edge ML Training
In this paper, we use an undirected graph G = (N ,L) to represent
a wireless edge network with general network topology, where N
and L are the sets of nodes and links, respectively, with num-
ber of nodes as |N | = n. We let x ∈ Rd denote a global deci-
sion vector to be learned or estimated. In edge ML training, we
want to distributively solve an unconstrained optimization prob-
lem: minx∈Rd f (x;D), and f (x;D) can be decomposed node-wise
as follows3:
min
x∈Rd
f (x;D) = min
x∈Rd
n∑
i=1
f (x;Di ), (1)
where f (x;D) = 1|D |
∑
z∈D f (x; z) for any dataset D. Here, each
local objective function f (x;Di ) is only observable to node i . It is
easy to see that Problem (1) can be equivalently reformulated as
the following consensus form:
min
n∑
i=1
f (xi ;Di ), s .t .xi = xj , ∀(i, j) ∈ L. (2)
where xi ∈ Rd is the local copy of x at node i . The constraints in
Problem (2) guarantee that the all local copies are equal to each
other, hence the name consensus form.
4.2 The SDM-DSGD Algorithm
As the name suggests, our proposed SDM-DSGDmethod is inspired
by the classical decentralized gradient descent (DGD) algorithm
[12, 16, 26], which is one of the most effective approaches for dis-
tributively solving network consensus optimization problems. The
DGD framework is built upon the notion of consensusmatrix, which
is denoted as W ∈ Rn×n in this paper. Specifically, in each itera-
tion of DGD, each node in the network performs an update that
integrates a local (stochastic) gradient step and a weighted aver-
age from its neighbors’ parameters based on W. Mathematically,
W satisfies the following properties:
1) Doubly Stochastic:
∑n
i=1[W]i j =
∑N
j=1[W]i j = 1.
2) Symmetric: [W]i j = [W]ji , ∀i, j ∈ N .
3) Network-Defined Sparsity Pattern: [W]i j > 0 if (i, j) ∈ L and
[W]i j = 0 otherwise, ∀i, j ∈ N .
Properties 1)–3) imply that the spectrum of W (i.e., the set of all
eigenvalues) lies in the interval (−1, 1]with exactly one eigenvalue
being equal to 1. Also, all eigenvalues being real implies that they
3Here we assume the datasets are balanced
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can be sorted as −1 < λn(W) ≤ · · · ≤ λ1(W) = 1. To facilitate
later discussions, we let β , max{|λ2(W)|, |λn(W)|} ∈ (0, 1), i.e.,
the second-largest eigenvalue of W in magnitude. The use of the
consensus matrix is due to the fact that (W⊗ IP )x = x if and only if
xi = xj , (i, j) ∈ L[16], where x = [x⊤1 , . . . , x⊤n ]⊤ and ⊗ represents
the Kronecker product. Therefore, Problem (2) can be reformulated
as minx∈RD
∑N
i=1 fi (xi ), s.t. (W⊗ IP )x = x, which further leads to
the original DGD algorithmic design[16]. With the notion of W,
our SDM-DSGD algorithm can be stated as follows:
Algorithm 1:ASparseDifferential Gaussian-Masking Distributed
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SDM-DSGD) Algorithm.
Initialization:
1. Set the initial state xi,0=yi,0=di,0=0, ∀i, and t = 1.
Main Loop:
2. In the t-th iteration, each node sends the sparsified differential
S(di,t ) to its neighbors, where S(·) is the sparsifier operation.
Also, upon collecting all neighbors’ information, each node i ∈
N updates the following local values:
a) Reconstruct node i’s neighbors inexact copies: xj,t =xj,t−1+
S(dj,t−1), ∀j ∈ Ni ;
b) Update local copy: yi,t = (1−θ)xi,t +θ
( ∑
j∈Ni [W]i jxj,t −
γ
(∇ f (xi,t ; ζi,t ) + ηi,t ) ) , where ∇ f (·; ζi,t ) is the stochas-
tic gradient, and ηi,t ∼ N (0,σ2Id ) is a Gaussian random
noise.
c) Compute the local differential: di,t =yi,t −xi,t .
3. Stop if some convergence criterion is met; otherwise, let t ←
t + 1 and go to Step 2.
Remark 1. Algorithm 1 is motivated by and bears some similar-
ity with the DGD-type communication-efficient distributed learn-
ing in the literature [21, 30]. In these existing work, rather than ex-
changing the states directly, the compressed differentials between
two successive iterations of the variables are communicated to re-
duce the communication load. By contrast, Algorithm1 differs from
these existing work in the following key aspects: i) As noted in Sec-
tion 1, the update in Step 2.b) in SDM-DSGD generalizes the exist-
ing work by using a linear combination of the current state and the
DSGD update. It was shown that when using the sparsification in
the proposed algorithm in [21], the transmit probability p in Def-
inition 2 is required to be greater than 4(1 − λn)2/(4(1 − λn)2 +
(1 − |λn |)2), where λn is the smallest eigenvalue ofW. In contrast,
our generalized framework allows a much smaller p in the sparsifi-
cation, i.e., significantly better communication-efficiency. ii) In ad-
dition to performance gains in terms of communication-efficiency,
as will be shown later, our generalized algorithm also improves
the convergence speed from O(T−1/3) to O˜(T−1/2) as long as p =
Ω(1/log(T )).
Before we state our main theoretical results, it is insightful to
offer some intuitions on how our SDM-DSGD method is derived.
Toward this end, we rewrite the update rule of in SDM-DSGD al-
gorithm in the following vector form:
xt = xt−1 + S(dt−1),
yt = (1 − θ)xt + θ
(
W˜xt − γ
(∇f(xt ; ζt ) + ηt )),
dt = yt − xt ,
(3)
where W˜ , W ⊗ In and f(xt ; ζt ) =
∑n
i=1 f (xi ; ζi,t ). Define a Lya-
punov function Vγ (x;D) , 12x⊤(I − W˜)x +
∑n
i=1 f (xi ;Di ), and
its stochastic version Vγ (x; ζ ) , 12x⊤(I − W˜)x +
∑n
i=1 f (xi ; ζi ),
where x = [x⊤1 , · · · , x⊤n ]⊤ ∈ Rnd and the random sample batch
ζ = {ζi }ni=1. It can be readily verified that:{
yt = xt − θ(∇Vγ (xt ; ζt ) + γηt ),
dt = −θ(∇Vγ (xt ; ζt ) + γηt ), (4)
which implies that the iterates update can be written as:
xt+1=xt +S(dt )=xt −θ∇Vγ (xt ; ζt )−θγηt +ϵt , (5)
where ϵt represents the noise from the sparsifier. Therefore, the
iterative update rule in SDM-DSGD can be viewed as applying the
stochastic gradient descent algorithm on the Lyapunov function
Vγ (x;D) with two additional noises θγηt and ϵt , one from the
privacy protection and the other one from the sparse compression.
4.3 Main Theoretical Results
In this subsection, we will establish the privacy and convergence
properties of the proposed SDM-DSGD method. For better read-
ability, we state the main theorems and their key insights in this
subsection and relegate the proofs of the main theorems to the ap-
pendices. We start with stating the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. The global objective function f (·) satisfies:
(1) Given dataset D = {Di }ni=1, f (x;D) is bounded from below,
i.e., ∃x∗D ∈ Rd , such that f (x;D) ≥ f (x∗D ;D), ∀x ∈ Rd ;
(2) The function f (x;z) is continuously differentiable and has L-
Lipschitz continuous gradient, i.e., there exists a constant L > 0
such that |∇ f (x;z) − ∇ f (y;z)| ≤ L‖x− y‖2, ∀x, y ∈ Rd ;
(3) The stochastic gradient is unbiased and has bounded variance
with respective to the local dataset, i.e. Ez∼Di [∇ f (x;z)] =
f (x;Di ) and Varz∼Di [∇ f (x;z)] ≤ σ˜2;
(4) The function f (x;z) is coordinate-wise G/
√
d-smooth, i.e., for
all coordinates k, |[∇ f (x;z)]k | ≤ G/
√
d .
The first three assumptions are standard for the convergence
analysis of stochastic algorithms [8, 11, 12]. The last assumption
characterizes the sensitivity of objective function with respect to
x in each coordinate. Note that it also implies the ℓ2-sensitivity
bound ‖∇ f (x;z)‖ ≤ G, which is useful for differential privacy (see
Defintion 3 in Appendix 1 and [9, 22]).
1) Privacy Analysis: In our SDM-DSGD algorithm, in the t-th
iteration, each node releases the local information S(dt ), which is
generated by first applying Gaussian masking on the local stochas-
tic gradient д(xi,t ; ζi,t ) and then the sparsifier operation on the lo-
cal differential dt . Consider the latent vectors ωi,t ∼ Bin(d,p) and
ωt = [ω⊤1,t , · · · ,ω⊤n,t ]⊤, where Bin(d,p) is the binomial distribu-
tion withd trials and success probabilityp. Each coordinate ofωi,t
denotes whether the information is transmitted or not. Note that
the generation ofωt does not depend on data. Define the active set
C1,i,t = {k : [ωi,t ]k = 1} and inactive set C0,i,t = {k : [ωi,t ]k =
0}, and C1,t = ∪iC1,i,t , C0,t = ∪iC0,i,t . Then, only active coordi-
nates are released. We perform this coordinate decomposition on
S(dt ) since the adversaries can only infer sensitive data from the
coordinates in C1,t , while the coordinates in C0,t are private. In
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what follows, we compare our mechanism with two existing pri-
vacy protection techniques:
1) Difference from randomized response mechanism: In our sparsi-
fier, the binomial vector z is used to determine the active and inac-
tive sets. A similar mechanism is the randomized response (RR)
mechanism [7, 24]. Our mechanism differs from RR as follows:
i) The RR mechanism is a binary-response query, e.g., {Yes,No},
while our query is sampling from Rd ; ii) The RR mechanism is
designed for the proportion estimation over several queries. How-
ever, in each iteration, only one query is available for the sparsifier.
2) Difference from sparse vector technique: In our privacy protec-
tion mechanism, due to the sparsity of the released vectors, part of
information is protected. This is similar to the idea of the sparse
vector technique (SVT) [6, 14, 19]. In SVT, a threshold value is cho-
sen so that only the first c queries above the threshold will be
released. For privacy protection, two randomized procedures are
used in SVT by adding noises on the threshold and queries. The key
difference between our method and SVT are: i) SVT is designed to
select c important queries (i.e. coordinates). However, in our algo-
rithm, the sparsity of the released vector is random based on trans-
mitted probabilityp. ii) In our method, the transmitted coordinates
are amplified by a (1/p)-factor to ensure that the released vector is
unbiased. In contrast, it can be verified that the released vector in
SVT is biased due to the lack of such an amplifying operation.
Theorem 1 (PrivacyGuarantee). Choose the variance of added
Gaussian noise η as σ2 ≥ 1/1.25. Under Assumption 1, for any
δ ∈ (0, 1), the execution of SDM-DSGD algorithm with T iterations
is (4α ∑Tt=1 |C1,t |(τG/√dmσ )2+ϵ/2, δ )-differentially-private,where
α = 2 log(1/δ )/ϵ + 1, |C1,t | = maxi {|C1,i,t |} and τ is the subsam-
pling rate for SGD.
Remark 2. The lower bound σ2 ≥ 1/1.25 follows from [23] to
guarantee the privacy amplification under the subsampling. The-
orem 1 shows that the sparsifier improves the differential privacy
guarantee by a factor
∑T
t=1 |C1,t |/dT ≤ 1, which depends on p.
Hence, the smaller the value of p, the less information will be com-
municated, and the better privacy protection. Meanwhile, it can be
seen that the privacy loss increases as the iteration number T gets
large, which is expected. This is because, with fewer iterations, less
information will be released, which implies a better privacy protec-
tion. However, fewer iterations cause a larger training loss in edge
ML. This leads to a training-privacy trade-off, which wewill further
analyze later. Also, by inverting Theorem 1, we have the following
result:
Corollary 2. Under the same conditions in Theorem 1 and let
the subsampling rate be 1/m (i.e., each node subsamples one out of
m data), if the variance of added Gaussian noise η is chosen as
σ2 ≥ max{ 8
∑T
t=1 |C1,t |G2(2 log(1/δ ) + ϵ)
dϵ2m4
,
1
1.25
}, (6)
then given the total iteration number T , the SDM-DSGD algorithm
is (ϵ, δ )-DP for any δ ∈ (0, 1).
2) Convergence Analysis for Training Loss: As shown in
Eq. (5), instead of directly optimizing f (x ;D), our SDM-DSGD
algorithm can be viewed as applying stochastic gradient descent
on the Lyapunov functionVγ (x;D). However, besides the random
sampling noise, we also have the noises from the Gaussian mask-
ing and sparsification. Note that the compression noise ϵ is depen-
dent on the sampling and added Gaussian masking noises, which
significantly complicates our convergence analysis. In what fol-
lows, we first quantify the optimization error of the sum output
x¯T =
∑n
i=1 xi,T .
Lemma 1 (Convergence). Under Assumption 1, fixing the vari-
ance of addedGaussian noise σ2 to be a constant, starting from xi,0 =
0 ∀i, and setting θ < 2p/(1 − λn + γL) ∈ (0, 1), the iterates xi,t gen-
erated by Eq. (5) satisfy:
min
t ∈{0, · · · ,T−1}
‖∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 ≤ (I) + (II) + (III) + (IV), (7)
where (I) = 2C1
θγT
, (II) = 2LC3n
( γ
1−β
)2
, (III) = 2θγ 2LC2
n(1−β ) ( 1p −1)+
LθγC2
n2p
,
and (IV) = ( 2γ L
n(1−β )+
L
n2
)( 1p−1)
[
2pnC1(
2p−(1−λn+γ L)θ
)
T
+
(1−λn+γ L)θ 2γC2
2p−(1−λn+γ L)θ
]
.
In the above terms,C1 , f (0;D)− f (x∗D ;D), C2 , nσ˜2/mτ+ndσ2
andC3 , (nG)2+ (ndσ )2 are constants, and σ˜2 is the variance of the
stochastic gradients.
Remark 3. There are four terms in the convergence error of
SDM-DSGD in Eq. (7): (I) is the common convergence error that
goes to zero as T and step-size θγ increase; (II) is the approxima-
tion error between the Lyapunov function Vγ (x;D) and f(x;D),
which decreases withγ . These two terms are similar to those in the
convergence of DGD-based algorithms [27, 30]; (III) and (IV) are
the error terms introduced by the compression, random sampling,
as well as the Gaussian masking noises. The following simplified
convergence rate result follows immediately from Lemma 1.
Corollary 3. Fixing the variance of Gaussian masking noise σ2
to be a constant, settingθ = min{p/(1−λn+γL),p/2},γ = c
√
n log(T )/T ,
and p ≫ 1/log(T ), where c is a constant, if the number of iterations
satisfies T > n5/(1 − β)4, then it holds that:
min
t ∈{0, · · · ,T−1}
‖∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 = O
(√ log(T )
nT
)
. (8)
Remark 4. Several remarks for Corollary 3 are in order: 1) The
parameter θ is used to adjust the variance introduced by the spar-
sifier and could be set to a constant over the iterations, while the
step-size γ is required to be diminishing to control the sampling
and Gaussian masking noises, as well as the approximation error;
2) The convergence rate is O(
√
log(T )/nT ) = O˜(1/√nT ), which
is approximately the same as the result in [12] (ignoring the log-
arithm factor); 3) In the standard DSGD algorithm [12], to reach
ε-accuracy, the communication complexity is O(d/ε2). In contrast,
the communication complexity of our algorithm isO(1/ε2 log(1/ε3))
by letting p = 1/d . Thus, our algorithm outperforms DSGD in
overparameterized regime (i.e., large d); 4) The lower bound of p is
1/log(T ). For example, with 104 training iterations (a common set-
ting for many deep learning training), the lower bound is approx-
imately 0.1, which is a small value; 5) The result in Corollary 3 is
based on two conditions: i) σ2 is fixed over all iterations; and ii)
the number of iterations T is sufficiently large.
Finally, by putting all aforementioned theoretical results together,
we have the following key result for training-privacy trade-off:
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Figure 1: (a) SDM-DSGD scheme; (b) The alternative design.
Theorem4 (Training-Privacy Trade-off). UnderAssumption
1, let σ2 = 8TG2(2 log(1/δ ) + ϵ)/m4ϵ2 , θ = min{p/(1 − λn +
γL),p/2}, and γ = c
√
n log(T )/T , where c is a constant. If T =
m4ϵ2/20G2 log(1/δ ) = O(m4), then the SDM-DSGD algorithm is
(ϵ, δ )-DP and the convergence rate is
min
t ∈{0, · · · ,T−1}
‖∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 = O˜
(√20G2 log(1/δ )√
nm2ϵ
)
. (9)
Remark 5. Note that by letting T = m4ϵ2/20G2 log(1/δ ) =
O(m4), we have that σ2 > 1/1.25 over all iterations. Note also
that the local sample sizem is usually much larger than the num-
ber of nodes, i.e.,m ≫ n, which implies thatm4ϵ2/20G2 log(1/δ ) >
n5/(1−β)4.Hence, the convergence speed improvement still holds
withT =m4ϵ2/20G2 log(1/δ ).
3) Insights and Guidelines for Privacy and Communica-
tion EfficiencyCo-Design:Note that in our algorithm, theGauss-
ianmasking is applied before the sparse compression (see Figure 1 (a).
Thus, a fundamental and interesting question arises: Is this a good
design? To answer this question, consider the alternative design
that reverses the Gaussian masking and sparsifier operations: we
first perform sparsify operation on the local differential, and then
apply Gaussian masking on those non-zero coordinates of the com-
pressed local differential (see Figure 1 (b)). This alternative design
can be mathematically written as:
xt = xt−1 +
(
S(dt−1) + θγ η˜t
)︸                ︷︷                ︸
released message
,
dt = (1 − θ)xt + θ
(
W˜xt − γ
(
g(xt ; ζt )
)) − xt ,
(10)
where [η˜t ]C1,t∼N (0,σ2I) and [η˜t ]C0,t = 0; and the factorθγ before
η˜t is to make the result comparable. For this alternative design, we
have the following result:
Proposition 5. Let the variance of Gaussian masking noise η be
chosen as σ2 ≥ 1/1.25. Under Assumption 1, for any δ ∈ (0, 1), the
alternative design in (10) is
(
4α
∑T
t=1 |C1,t |(τG)2/dm2σ2p2+ϵ/2, δ
)
-
DP, where α , 2 log(1/δ )/ϵ − 1, p is the transmit probability of the
sparsifier, and τ is the subsampling rate.
We can see that, in the “ϵ-part,” the DP performance of our SDM-
DSGD is smaller than that of the alternative design by a (1/p2)-
factor, and so our SDM-DSGD design is superior. This difference is
because in the alternative design, the sparse compression amplifies
the ℓ2-sensitivity of the query by 1/p2.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we present experimental results of several noncon-
vex machine learning problems to evaluate the performance of our
method. In particular, we compare the communication cost and
privacy-accuracy trade-off with two state-of-art algorithms:
(a) MLR on MNIST.
(b) CNN on MNIST.
Figure 2: Two examples where DC-DSGD diverges: p = 0.2
and the step-size γ is chosen from {0.1, 0.01, 0.001}.
• Decentralized SGD (DSGD)[10, 16, 26]: Each node updates its
local parameter as xi,t+1 =
∑
j∈Ni [W]i jxj,t −γд(xi,t ; ζi,t ) with
stochastic gradient д(xi,t ; ζi,t ) of random sample ζi,t , and ex-
change the uncompressed local parameter xi with its neighbors.
• Differential Compressed Decentralized SGD (DC-DSGD) [21]:
This algorithmalso communicates compressed local differentials
and estimating neighbors’ copies. However, in the local copy up-
dating step, DC-DSDG does not have tuning parameter θ (or can
be viewed as fixing θ = 1 in our SDM-DSGD).
In our experiment, we choose the transmit probabilityp from {1, 0.5, 0.2}.
We set θ = 1 for p = 1 and 0.5, which is corresponding to DSGD
and DC-DSGD, respectively. However, for p = 0.2, the algorithm
does not converge if we choose θ = 1, i.e., DC-DSGD fails under
p = 0.2 (See Figure 2). Thus, we set θ = 0.6 for the case when
p = 0.2, which is corresponding to our algorithm.
Dataset and Learning Models:We adopt all three algorithms
to solve a variety of nonconvex learning problems over MNIST and
CIFAR-10 datasets. For MNIST, we apply the multi-class logistic
regression (MLR) and convolutional neural network (CNN) classi-
fiers. The adopted CNN model has two convolutional layers (size
3× 3× 16), each is followed by a max-pooling layer with size 2× 2,
and then a fully connected layer. The ReLU activation is used for
the two convolutional layers and the “softmax” activation is ap-
plied at the output layer. For CIFAR-10, we apply the above CNN
model and the ResNet20 model. The batch size is 64 for both MLR
and the CNN classifiers on MNIST. The batch size is 128 and 32 for
the CNN and ResNet20 classifiers on CIFAR-10, respectively.
Network Model: We use a network with 50 nodes. Similar to
[17, 18], the communication graph G is generated by the ErdÜos-
Re`nyi graph with edge connectivity pc = 0.35. The network con-
census matrix is chosen asW = I− 2
3λmax(L)L,where L is the Lapla-
cian matrix of G, and λmax(L) denotes the largest eigenvalue of
L.
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(a) MLR on MNIST.
(b) CNN on MNIST.
(c) CNN on CIFAR-10.
(d) ResNet20 on CIFAR-10.
Figure 3: Results of objective loss (left) and testing accuracy
(right) with models trained by different algorithms.
Procedure for Privacy: Note that privacy protection is not
considered in the original DSGD and DC-DSGD methods. To have
a fair comparison, we add the same Gaussian noise N (0, I) to the
stochastic gradients, so that all algorithms are privacy-preserving.
To control the object function’s ℓ2-sensitivity to x, we adopt a mod-
ified gradient clipping technique [1]: Clip([д]i ) = sign([д]i )max{|[д]i |,C},
∀д ∈ Rd . With this clipping, each coordinate of the gradient is
bounded by C in magnitude. Here, we set C = 5. In our experi-
ment, we keep track of the privacy loss based on Theorem 1.
Numerical Results: We illustrate the results of training loss
and testing accuracy with respect to communication costs in Fig-
ure 3. We compute the total non-zero digits (i.e. the non-sparsified
digits) communicated in the each iteration, which is used to mea-
sure the communication cost in the training. In the left-hand-side
figures in Figure 3, we show the training loss vs. the amount of
the non-zero digits. In the right-hand-side figures in Figure 3, we
Table 1: The results of testing accuracy with models trained
by different algorithms with (ϵ, δ = 10−5)-DP guarantee.
MLR on MNIST
ϵ(×10−3) 1.0 2.0 5.0
DSGD 0.1422 0.1956 0.6324
DC-DSGD 0.1621 0.2959 0.7408
SDM-DSGD 0.1880 0.4296 0.7810
CNN on MNIST
ϵ(×10−2) 2.0 5.0 10.0
DSGD 0.0886 0.1059 0.2570
DC-DSGD 0.0917 0.1442 0.5265
SDM-DSGD 0.0960 0.2150 0.6728
CNN on CIFAR-10
ϵ(×10−2) 5.0 10.0 20.0
DSGD 0.2960 0.3036 0.3544
DC-DSGD 0.2991 0.3292 0.3964
SDM-DSGD 0.3013 0.3570 0.4296
ResNet20 on CIFAR-10
ϵ(×10−2) 2.0 5.0 10.0
DSGD 0.3265 0.4631 0.5735
DC-DSGD 0.3324 0.4922 0.5957
SDM-DSGD 0.3470 0.5079 0.6099
show the testing accuracy vs the amount of the non-zero digits.
We can see that under the same amount of non-zero digits, our
SDM-DSGD has the fastest convergence speed and the best testing
accuracy: in the case of training CNN on MNIST, with 6× 109 non-
zero digits, SDM-DSGD’s testing accuracy is at 80%, while those of
DC-DSGD and DSGD are 60% and less than 40%, respectively.
For privacy loss, we summarize the results in Table 1. We can
see that under the same δ , the testing accuracy is increasing as
the privacy budget gets large (i.e., large ϵ): in the case of MLR on
MNIST, with ϵ increasing from 1× 103 to 5× 103, testing accuracy
is increasing from 19% to 78%. This is because with larger privacy
budget, more information is allowed to be released, which leads
to a better training. Meanwhile, under the same privacy budget ϵ,
our SDM-DSGD consistently has a higher accuracy compared with
the other two algorithms: our algorithm improves the accuracy at
least 4% with MLR and 15% with CNN on MNIST.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed the SDM-DSGD algorithm to improve
bothdata privacy and communication efficiency in distributed edge
learning. In our SDM-DSGD algorithm, we proposed to exchange
the sparsified differentials between the computation nodes and de-
velop a “generalized” computing scheme for local updates. We the-
oretically and numerically showed that by doing so, the proposed
algorithm converges with a small sparsification probability p com-
pared with the state-of-the-art DC-DSGD method. Moreover, we
considered the protection data privacy by injecting a Gaussianmask-
ing noise. We studied the interaction between the sparsification
and theGaussianmaskingmechanism and showed that the “randomize-
then-sparisify” is the preferred approach. Finally, we established
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the privacy-accuracy tradeoff theoretically. Through extensive ex-
periments, we showed that SDM-DSGD outperforms existing algo-
rithms. Our results advance the state-of-the-art of communication
efficiency and data privacy in distributed edge learning.
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A PROOF OF MAIN RESULTS
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. To prove the privacy guarantee, we first states the fol-
lowing definitions and related lemmas.
Definition 3 (ℓ2-Sensitivity). The ℓ2-Sensitivity is defined as
the maximum change in the ℓ2-Norm of the function value f (·) on
two adjacent datasets D and D′:
∆(f ) = max
D,D′
‖ f (D) − f (D′)‖2, (11)
where D and D′ are two adjacent datasets if only one element are
different.
Definition 4 (Re´nyiDifferential Privacy (RDP) [15]). A ran-
domizedmechanismM : DN → Rd is (α , ρ)-Re´nyi Differential Pri-
vacy
((α , ρ)-RDP) , if for any two adjacent dataset D, D′ ∈ DN , it
holds that
Dα (M(D)‖M(D′)) = 1
α − 1 logE
( M(D)
M(D′)
)α
≤ ρ, (12)
where the expectation is taken over M(D′). Dα (·‖·) is also known
as Re´nyi divergence.
Lemma 2 (RDP of Gaussian Mechanism [23]). Consider the
mechanism M = f (D) + η, with the function f : D → Rd and
Gaussian noise η ∼ N (0,σ2Id ).
i). The mechanism M is (α ,α∆2(f )/(2σ2)-RDP, where ∆(f ) is
the ℓ2-Sensitivity of f ;
ii). If the mechanism M is applied to a subset of samples using
uniform sampling without replacement and σ2 ≥ 1.1/25, then
M is (α ,ατ 2∆2(f )/σ2)-RDP, where τ is the sampling rate.
Lemma 3 (Seqential Composibility of RDP [15]). Consider
f : DN → Rd1 and д : DN ×Rd1 → Rd2 . If f is (α , ρ1)-RDP and д
is (α , ρ2)-RDP, then the mechanism (X ,Y ) satisfies (α , ρ1 + ρ2)-RDP,
where X ∼ f (D) and Y ∼ д(X ,D).
Lemma 4 (From RDP to (ϵ, δ )-DP [15]). If f is an (α , ρ)-RDP
mechanism, then it also satisfies
(
ρ + log(1/δ )/(α − 1),δ )-DP for
any δ ∈ (0, 1).
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With the above definition and lemmas, we provide the following
privacy guarantee for our algorithm in the following. Our proof
is inspired by [22]. Given the active set at tth iteration C1,t , and
C1,i,t respective to the ith node, the updating equation (5) can be
rewritten as:
[xt+1]C1,t = [xt ]C1,t − [(θ∇Vγ (xt ; ζt ) + θγηt )/p]C1,t (13)
= [xt ]C1,t − θ
([∇Vγ (xt ; ζt )]C1,t + γ [ηt ]C1,t )/p (14)
Thus, we need to analyze the privacy gaurantee of the above SGD
updating with noise [ηt ]C1,t , of which each coordinate is from
N (0,σ2).Given datasetD, consider the followingmechanism Mˆt =
[∇Vγ (xt ;D)]C1,t +γ [ηt ]C1,t with the query qt = [∇Vγ (xt ;D)]C1,t .
With the adjacent datasets D and D′, the ℓ2-sensitivity of qt is
∆(qt ) = ‖[∇Vγ (xt ;D)]C1,t − [∇Vγ (xt ;D′)]C1,t ‖2
= ‖[(W˜xt − γ∇f(xt ;Di )) − (W˜xt − γ∇f(xt ;D′i ))]C1,t ‖2
= γ
∑n
i=1
‖[∇ f (xi,t ;Di ) − ∇ f (xi,t ;D′i )]C1, i,t ‖2
(a)
=
γ
m
‖[∇ f (xi,t |ζi, j ) − ∇ f (xi,t ; ζ ′i, j )]C1, i,t ‖2
=
γ
m
√∑
k ∈C1, i,t ([∇ f (xi,t ; ζi, j )]k − [∇ f (xi,t ; ζ
′
i, j )]k )2
(b )≤ 2γ
√
|C1,i,t |G√
dm
≤
2γ
√
|C1,t |G
√
dm
(15)
where (a) by assuming that the only different data is ζi, j and ζ
′
i, j
in the ith node; (b) by the coordinate-wise G/
√
d-Lipschitz of the
function f (·), and |C1,t | = maxi {|C1,i,t |} ≤ d . Thus, based on
Lemma 2 i), with ηt ∼ N (0,σ2Ind ), the mechanism Mˆt satisfies(
α , 2α |C1,t |(G/
√
dmσ )2)-RDP4. Then for the mechanism Mt =
[∇Vγ (xt ; ζt )]C1,t + γ [ηt ]C1,t , which is equivalent to applying Mˆt
to a subset of random sample ζ t , according to Lemma 2 ii), Mt
satisfies
(
α , 4α |C1,t |(τG/
√
dmσ )2)-RDP with σ2 ≥ 1/1.25. So set
α = 2 log(1/δ )/ϵ + 1 and with Lemma 4, we have Mt satisfies
(4α |C1,t |(τG/
√
dmσ )2 + ϵ/2, δ )-DP with σ2 ≥ 1/1.25.
Next, we derive the privacy guarantee overT iterations. By Lemma
3, withT iterations, i.e. sequentially composition of {Mt }Tt=1, the
algorithm outputxT satisifies
(
α ,
∑T
t=1 4α |C1,t |(τG/
√
dmσ )2)-RDP.
With Lemma 4, xT satisfies (4α
∑T
t=1 |C1,t |(τG/
√
dmσ )2 + ϵ/2, δ )-
DP when σ2 ≥ 1/1.25. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Under this design, we have the updating:
[xt+1]C1,t = [xt ]C1,t − [θ∇Vγ (xt ; ζt )/p + θγ η˜t ]C1,t . (16)
Consider the mechanism Mˆt = [θ∇Vγ (xt ;D)/p]C1,t + θγ [η˜t ]C1,t
with the queryqt = [θ∇Vγ (xt ;D)/p]C1,t .With the adjacent datasets
4Note that the mechanism Mˆt adds the Gaussian noise γ [ηt ]C1,t ∼
N (0, γ 2σ 2IC1, i,t ).
D and D′, we have the ℓ2-sensitivity of qt is
∆(qt ) = θ
p
‖[∇Vγ (xt ;D)]C1,t − [∇Vγ (xt ;D′)]C1,t ‖2
=
θ
p
‖[(W˜xt − γ∇f(xt ;Di )) − (W˜xt − γ∇f(xt ;D′i ))]C1,t ‖2
=
θγ
p
‖
∑n
i=1
[∇ f (xi,t ;Di ) − ∇ f (xi,t ;D′i )]C1, i,t ‖2
(a)
=
θγ
mp
‖[∇ f (xi,t ; ζi, j ) − ∇ f (xi,t ; ζ ′i, j )]C1, i,t ‖2
=
θγ
mp
√∑
k ∈C1, i,t ([∇ f (xi,t ; ζi, j )]k − [∇ f (xi,t ; ζ
′
i, j )]k )2
(b )≤ 2θγ
√
|C1,i,t |G√
dmp
≤
2θγ
√
|C1,t |G
√
dmp
(17)
where (a) by assuming that the only different data is ζi, j and ζ
′
i, j in
the ith node; (b) by the coordinate-wiseG/
√
d-Lipschitz of the func-
tion f (·). Thus, based on Lemma 2 i), with [η˜t ]C1,t ∼ N (0,σ2I),
the mechanism Mˆt satisfies
(
α , 2α |C1,t |(G/
√
dmσp)2)-RDP. De-
fine themechanismMt = [θ∇Vγ (xt ; ζt )/p]C1,t +[η˜t ]C1,t .With the
similar derivation, we haveMt satisfies (4α |C1,t |(τG)2/dm2σ2p2+
ϵ/2, δ )-DP with σ2 ≥ 1/1.25. Hence with T iterations, the algo-
rithm satisfies (4α ∑Tt=1 |C1,t |(τG)2/dm2σ2p2+ϵ/2, δ )-DPwith σ2 ≥
1/1.25. 
A.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. First, we give the following useful lemma.
Lemma 5. Under the same conditions in Lemma 1, at t th iteration,
the random sparsified output S(dt ) has:
i). First Moment: E[S(dt )|xt ] = −θ∇Vγ (xt ;D);
ii). SecondMoment:E[‖S(dt )‖22 |xt ] ≤ θ
2
p ‖∇Vγ (xt ;D)‖22+
(θγ )2
p (nσ˜
2
mτ +
ndσ2).
Proof. i). For the first moment,
E[S(dt )|xt ] = E[E[S(dt )|dt ]|xt ] = E[dt |xt ]
= E[−θ(∇Vγ (xt ; ζt ) + γηt )|xt ]
= −θ∇Vγ (xt ;D) (18)
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ii). For the second moment,
E[‖S(dt )‖22 |xt ] = ‖E[S(dt )]|xt ‖22 + Var[S(dt )|xt ]
(a)
= θ2 ‖∇Vγ (xt ;D)‖22 + E[Var[S(dt )|dt ]|xt ] + Var[E[S(dt )|dt ]|xt ]
(b )
= θ2‖∇Vγ (xt ;D)‖22 + (
1
p
− 1)E[‖dt ‖22 |xt ] + Var[dt |xt ]
(c)≤ θ2 ‖∇Vγ (xt ;D)‖22 + (
1
p
− 1)θ2E[‖∇Vγ (xt ; ζt ) + γηt ‖22 |xt ]
+ (θγ )2(nσ˜
2
mτ
+ ndσ2)
(d )
= θ2‖∇Vγ (xt ;D)‖22 + (
1
p
− 1)θ2E[‖∇Vγ (xt ; ζt )‖22 + ‖γηt ‖22 |xt ]
+ (θγ )2(n σ˜
2
mτ
+ ndσ2)
≤ θ2 ‖∇Vγ (xt ;D)‖22 + (
1
p
− 1)θ2[‖∇Vγ (xt ;D)‖22
+ γ 2( nσ˜
2
mnτ
+ dσ2)] + (θγ )2( σ˜
2
mτ
+ ndσ2)
=
θ2
p
‖∇Vγ (xt ;D)‖22 +
(θγ )2
p
(nσ˜
2
mτ
+ ndσ2) (19)
where (a) is by the Eve’s law; (b) is from the properies of the sparsi-
fier in Section 3; (c) is by dt = −θ(∇Vγ (xt ; ζt )+γηt ), at each node
the subsampling rate is τ ; (d) is because the randomness of the sub-
sampling and the Gaussian mechanism are independent. 
Step 1: Define the filtration Ft = σ 〈x1, · · · , xt 〉. Note that the
Lyapunov function Vγ (x;D) has (1 − λn + γL)-Lipschitz gradient.
Thus, we have
Vγ (xt+1;D)
≤ Vγ (xt ;D) + 〈∇Vγ (xt ;D), xt+1 − xt 〉 +
(1 − λn + γL)
2
‖xt+1 − xt ‖2
= Vγ (xt ;D) + 〈∇Vγ (xt ;D), S(dt )〉 +
(1 − λn + γL)
2
‖S(dt )‖2
(20)
Take conditional expectation at both sides:
E[Vγ (xt+1)|Ft ]
≤ Vγ (xt ;D) + 〈∇Vγ (xt ;D), E[S(dt )|Ft ]〉 +
(1 − λn + γL)
2
E[‖S(dt )‖2 |Ft ]
= Vγ (xt ;D) − θ ‖∇Vγ (xt ;D)‖22 +
(1 − λn + γL)
2
[θ
2
p
‖∇Vγ (xt ;D)‖22+
(θγ )2
p
(nσ˜
2
mτ
+ dσ2)]
≤ Vγ (xt ) +
( (1 − λn + γL)θ2
2p
− θ ) ‖∇Vγ (xt ;D)‖22
+
(1 − λn + γL)(θγ )2
2p
(nσ˜
2
mτ
+ ndσ2) (21)
Thus, by setting 2pθ −(1−λn+γL)θ2 > 0, i.e. θ < 2p/(1−λn+γL),
we have the following descent inequality:(
2pθ − (1 − λn + γL)θ2
) ‖∇Vγ (xt ;D)‖22
≤ 2p(Vγ (xt ) − E[Vγ (xt+1)|Ft ]) + (1 − λn + γL)(θγ )2(nσ˜
2
mτ
+ ndσ2).
(22)
Telescope the inequalities from t = 0 to T , it holds that:(
2pθ − (1 − λn + γL)θ2
)∑T
t=0
E‖∇Vγ (xt ;D)‖22
≤ 2p(Vγ (x0;D) − E[Vγ (xT+1;D)])
+ (1 − λn + γL)(θγ )2(nσ˜
2
mτ
+ ndσ2)(T + 1) (23)
Because of the two facts thatVγ (xT+1;D) ≥ γ
∑n
i=1 f (xi,T+1;Di ) ≥
γ
∑n
i=1 f (x∗D ;Di ) and Vγ (x0;D) = γ
∑n
i=1 f (0;Di ), it holds that:(
2pθ − (1 − λn + γL)θ2
)∑T
t=0
E‖∇Vγ (xt ;D)‖22
≤ 2pγ (∑n
i=1
f (0;Di ) −
∑n
i=1
f (x∗D ;Di )
)
+ (1 − λn + γL)(θγ )2(nσ˜
2
mτ
+ ndσ2)(T + 1). (24)
Thus, we have∑T
t=0
E‖∇Vγ (xt ;D)‖22 ≤
2pnγC1(
2pθ − (1 − λn + γL)θ2
)
+
(1 − λn + γL)θγ 2(T + 1)C2
2p − (1 − λn + γL)θ . (25)
whereC1 = f (0;D)− f (x∗D ;D) andC2 = nσ˜2/mτ +ndσ2 are two
constants.
Step 2: In the following, we provide the bound for ‖xt − x¯t ‖ =
‖ (Ind − ( 1n 1n1⊤n ) ⊗ Id )xt ‖, where x¯t = (( 1n 1n1⊤n ) ⊗ Id )xt . For
notation convenience, we define Q = Ind −( 1n 1n1⊤n ) ⊗ Id , f(x; ζ ) =∑n
i=1 f (xi ; ζi ). From the updating (5), it holds that:
xt = xt−1 − θ(∇Vγ (xt−1; ζt−1) + γηt−1) + ϵt−1
= xt−1 − θ
((I − W˜)xt−1 + γ∇f(xt−1; ζt−1) + γηt−1) + ϵt−1
=
((1 − θ)I + θW˜)xt−1 − θγ∇f(xt−1; ζt−1) − θγηt−1 + ϵt−1 .
(26)
It can be seen that the updating is the stochastic DGD updating
with a mixed concensus matrix W˜θ = (1 − θ)I + θW˜, which is
also doubly stochastic with θ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, it holds that starting
x0 = 0,
xt = W˜θ xt−1 − θγ∇f(xt−1; ζt−1) − θγηt−1 + ϵt−1
=
∑t−1
s=0
W˜t−1−s
θ
( − θγ∇f(xs ; ζs ) − θγηs + ϵs ), (27)
then due to the rows sums and columns sum of W˜θ are 1, it holds
that
Qxt = Q
∑t−1
s=0
W˜t−1−s
θ
( − θγ∇f(xs ; ζs ) − θγηs + ϵs )
=
∑t−1
s=0
(
W˜t−1−s
θ
− ( 1
n
1n1
⊤
n ) ⊗ Id
) ( − θγ∇f(xs ; ζs ) − θγηs + ϵs ) ,
(28)
Private and Communication-Efficient Learning over Networks MobiHoc ’20, June 30 – July 03, 2020, Shanghai, China
which results to
‖Qxt ‖22
= 2‖
∑t−1
s=0
(
W˜t−1−s
θ
− ( 1
n
1n1
⊤
n ) ⊗ Id
) ( − θγ∇f(xs ; ζs ) − θγηs ) ‖22
+ 2‖
∑t−1
s=0
(
W˜t−1−s
θ
− ( 1
n
1n1
⊤
n ) ⊗ Id
)
ϵs ‖22
= 2‖
∑t−1
s=0
(
W˜t−1−s
θ
− ( 1
n
1n1
⊤
n ) ⊗ Id
) ( − θγ∇f(xs ; ζs ) − θγηs ) ‖22
+
∑t−1
s=0
2‖ (W˜t−1−s
θ
− ( 1
n
1n1
⊤
n ) ⊗ Id
)
ϵs ‖22
+
∑t−1
s,s ′=0,s,s ′
2〈(W˜t−1−s
θ
− ( 1
n
1n1
⊤
n ) ⊗ Id
)
ϵs ,(
W˜t−1−s
′
θ
− ( 1
n
1n1
⊤
n ) ⊗ Id
)
ϵs ′ 〉 (29)
Take the expectation at the both sides,
1
2
E[‖Qxt ‖22 ]
(a)
= E[‖
∑t−1
s=0
(
W˜t−1−s
θ
− ( 1
n
1n1
⊤
n ) ⊗ Id
) ( − θγ∇f(xs ; ζs ) − θγηs ) ‖22]
+
∑t−1
s=0
E[‖ (W˜t−1−s
θ
− ( 1
n
1n1
⊤
n ) ⊗ Id
)
ϵs ‖22 ]
≤ E[‖
∑t−1
s=0
(
W˜t−1−s
θ
− ( 1
n
1n1
⊤
n ) ⊗ Id
) ( − θγ∇f(xs |ζs ) − θγηs ) ‖22]
+
∑t−1
s=0
β
2(t−1−s)
θ
( 1
p
− 1)E‖θ(∇V (xs |ζs ) + γηs )‖22
≤ (θγ )2
∑t−1
s=0
βt−1−s
θ
∑t−1
s ′=0
βt−1−s
′
θ
E[‖∇f(xs ; ζs ) + ηs ‖22 ]
1
2
E[‖∇f(xs ′; ζs ′) + ηs ′ ‖22 ]
1
2 + ( 1
p
− 1)E‖θ(∇V (xs ; ζs ) + γηs )‖22
(b )≤ (θγ )2
∑t−1
s=0
βt−1−s
θ
∑t−1
s ′=0
βt−1−s
′
θ
((nG)2 + (ndσ )2)
+ ( 1
p
− 1)E‖θ(∇V (xs ; ζs ) + γηs )‖22
≤ (θγ )
2((nG)2 + (ndσ )2)
(1 − βθ )2
+
∑t−1
s=0
β
2(t−1−s)
θ
θ2( 1
p
− 1)E[‖∇V (xs ;D)‖2
+ γ 2(nσ˜
2
mτ
+ ndσ2)]
≤ (θγ )
2((nG)2 + (ndσ )2)
(1 − βθ )2
+
θ2γ 2C2
1 − β2
θ
( 1
p
− 1)
+
∑t−1
s=0
β
2(t−1−s)
θ
θ2( 1
p
− 1)E[‖∇V (xs ;D)‖2]
(c)≤
( θγ
1 − βθ
)2
C3 +
θ2γ 2C2
1 − βθ
( 1
p
− 1)]
+
∑t−1
s=0
β
2(t−1−s)
θ
θ2( 1
p
− 1)E‖∇V (xs ;D)‖2
(d )≤
( γ
1 − β
)2
C3 +
θγ 2C2
1 − β (
1
p
− 1)
+
∑t−1
s=0
β
2(t−1−s)
θ
θ2( 1
p
− 1)E[‖∇V (xs ;D)‖2] (30)
where βθ = max{|λ2(Wθ )|, |λn(Wθ )|} with W = (1 − θ)I + θW
and (a) is because of E[ϵt ] = 0; (b) is because the function f(x; ζ )
is coordinately G/
√
d-Lipschitz and hence E[‖∇f(x;ζ ) + η2‖22 ] =
E[‖∇f(x;ζ )‖22 + ‖η2‖22 ] ≤ (nG)2 + (ndσ )2; (c) is because of βθ ∈
(0, 1) and C3 = (nG)2 + (ndσ )2; (d) is from Lemma 6.
Lemma 6. Given θ ∈ (0, 1), it holds
1
1 − βθ
≤ 1
θ(1 − β) (31)
with βθ =max{|λ2(Wθ )|, |λn(Wθ )|} and β =max{|λ2(W)|, |λn(W)|}.
Proof. First, for 1/(1 − β), according to the definition:
β = max{|λ2(W)|, |λn(W)|}
⇒ 1 − β = min{1 − |λ2(W)|, 1 − |λn(W)|}
⇒ 1/(1 − β) = max{1/(1 − |λ2(W)|), 1/(1 − |λn(W)|)}. (32)
Then for 1/(1− βθ ), note thatWθ = (1− θ)I + θW, which implies
λi (Wθ ) = (1− θ) + θλi (W). So βθ = max{|(1− θ) + θλ2(W)|, |(1−
θ) + θλn (W)|}. Note that for any λ ∈ (−1, 1] and θ ∈ (0, 1) it holds
that |(1 − θ) + θλ | ≤ (1 − θ) + θ |λ |, thus,
βθ ≤ max{(1 − θ) + θ |λ2(W)|, (1 − θ) + θ |λn (W)|}
⇒ 1 − β ≥ min{θ − θ |λ2(W)|,θ − θ |λn (W)|}
⇒ 1/(1 − βθ ) ≤ max{1/θ(1 − |λ2(W)|), 1/θ(1 − |λn(W)|)}
⇒ 1/(1 − βθ ) ≤ 1/θ(1 − β). (33)

Step 3: Note that xt = W˜θ xt−1 − θγ∇f(xt−1 |ζt−1) − θγηt−1 +
ϵt−1, which implies that
x¯t = x¯t−1 − 1
n
∑n
i=1
[θγ∇ f (xi,t−1; ζi,t−1) − θγηi,t−1 + ϵi,t−1]
= x¯t−1 − θγ
n
∑n
i=1
[∇ f (xi,t−1 |ζi,t−1) − ηi,t−1 + ϵi,t−1/θγ ]
= x¯t−1 −
θγ
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f˜ (xi,t−1 |Bi,t−1), (34)
where ∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t ) = ∇ f (xi,t ; ζi,t ) − ηi,t + ϵi,t /θγ , and Bi,t =
σ 〈ζi,t ,ηi,t ,ϵi,t /θγ 〉.
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Consider f (x¯t ;D) = 1n
∑n
i=1 f (x¯t ;Di ), by the L-Lipschitz con-
tinuous gradient, it holds:
f (x¯t+1;D) ≤ f (x¯t ;D) + 〈∇ f (x¯t ;D), x¯t+1 − x¯t 〉 + L
2
‖x¯t+1 − x¯t ‖22
≤ f (x¯t ;D) − 〈∇ f (x¯t ;D),
θγ
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t )〉
+
L
2
‖ θγ
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t )‖22
≤ f (x¯t ;D) − 〈∇ f (x¯t ;D), θγ∇ f (x¯t ;D) + θγ
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t )
− θγ∇ f (x¯t ;D)〉 + L
2
‖θγ∇ f (x¯t ;D) +
θγ
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t )
− θγ∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22
≤ f (x¯t ;D) − θγ ‖∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 − 〈∇ f (x¯t ;D),
θγ
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t )
− θγ∇ f (x¯t ;D)〉 + L
2
[‖θγ∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 + ‖
θγ
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t )
− θγ∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 + 2〈θγ∇ f (x¯t ;D),
θγ
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t )
− θγ∇ f (x¯t ;D)〉] (35)
Take conditional expectation, it holds:
E[f (x¯t+1 ;D)|Ft ]
(a)≤ f (x¯t ;D) − θγ ‖∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 − 〈∇ f (x¯t ;D),
θγ
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f (xi,t ;Di )
− θγ∇ f (x¯t ;D)〉 + L
2
[‖θγ∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 + E[‖
θγ
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t )
− θγ∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 |Ft ] + 2〈θγ∇ f (x¯t ;D),
θγ
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f (xi,t ;Di )
− θγ∇ f (x¯t ;D)〉]
= f (x¯t ;D) − (θγ −
L(θγ )2
2
)‖∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22
+ (θγ − L(θγ )2)〈∇ f (x¯t ;D), ∇ f (x¯t ;D) − 1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f (xi,t ;Di )〉
+
L(θγ )2
2
E[‖ 1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t ) − ∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 |Ft ]
(b )
≤ f (x¯t ;D) − (θγ −
L(θγ )2
2
)‖∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 +
θγ − L(θγ )2
2
×
[‖∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 + ‖
1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f (xi,t ;Di ) − ∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 ]
+
L(θγ )2
2
E[‖ 1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t ) − ∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 |Ft ]
= f (x¯t ;D) −
θγ
2
‖∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22
+
θγ − L(θγ )2
2
‖ 1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f (xi,t ;Di ) − ∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22
+
L(θγ )2
2
E[‖ 1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t ) − ∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 |Ft ]︸                                                        ︷︷                                                        ︸
(A)
(36)
where (a) is because E[∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t )|Ft ] = ∇ f (xi,t ;Di ); (b) is by
2〈a,b〉 ≤ ‖a‖22 + ‖b‖22 . Now we give the bound for (A) : Note that
E[‖ 1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t ) − ∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 |Ft ]
= E[‖ 1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t ) − 1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f (xi,t ;D)
+
1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f (xi,t ;D) − ∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 |Ft ]
(a)
= E[‖ 1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t ) − 1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f (xi,t ;D)‖22 |Ft ]
+ ‖ 1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f (xi,t ;D) − ∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 . (37)
where (a) is becauseE[ 1n
∑n
i=1 ∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t )|Ft ] = 1n
∑n
i=1 ∇ f (xi,t ;D).
Recall the definition that ∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t ) = ∇ f (xi,t ; ζi,t ) − ηi,t +
ϵi,t /θγ , hence,
E[‖ 1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t ) − 1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f (xi,t ;D)‖22 |Ft ]
(a)
=
1
n2
∑n
i=1
E[‖∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t ) − ∇ f (xi,t ;D)‖22 |Ft ]
=
1
n2
∑n
i=1
E[‖∇ f (xi,t ; ζi,t ) − ηi,t + ϵi,t /θγ − ∇ f (xi,t ;D)‖22 |Ft ]
(b )
=
1
n2
∑n
i=1
E[‖∇ f (xi,t ; ζi,t ) − ∇ f (xi,t ;D)‖22
+ ‖ηi,t ‖22 + ‖ϵi,t /θγ ‖22 |Ft ]
≤ 1
n
[ σ˜
2
mτ
+ dσ2] + ( 1
nθγ
)2
E[‖ϵt ‖22 |Ft ]
≤ 1
n
[ σ˜
2
mτ
+ dσ2] + ( 1
nθγ
)2
E[( 1
p
− 1)‖θVγ (xt |ζt ) + θγηt ‖22 |Ft ]
≤ 1
n
[ σ˜
2
mτ
+ dσ2] + ( 1
nγ
)2( 1
p
− 1)[‖Vγ (xt ;D)‖22 +
γ 2σ˜2n
mτ
+ γ 2σ2nd]
=
( 1
nγ
)2( 1
p
− 1)‖Vγ (xt ;D)‖22 +
1
np
( σ˜
2
mτ
+ σ2d) (38)
where (a) is because the noise is independent across i, and (b) is
because the expectation of the three terms are zero. Thus, we have
E[f (x¯t+1 ;D)|Ft ]
≤ f (x¯t ;D) − θγ
2
‖∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22
+
θγ − L(θγ )2
2
‖ 1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f (xi,t ;Di ) − ∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22
+
L(θγ )2
2
E[‖ 1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t ) − ∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 |Ft ]
≤ f (x¯t ;D) −
θγ
2
‖∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22
+
θγ − L(θγ )2
2
‖ 1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f (xi,t ;Di ) − ∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22
+
L(θγ )2
2
E[‖ 1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f˜ (xi,t |Bi,t ) − 1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f (xi,t ;D)‖22 |Ft ]
+
L(θγ )2
2
‖ 1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f (xi,t ;D) − ∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22
≤ f (x¯t ;D) − θγ
2
‖∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22
Private and Communication-Efficient Learning over Networks MobiHoc ’20, June 30 – July 03, 2020, Shanghai, China
+
θγ
2
‖ 1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f (xi,t ;Di ) − ∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22
+
L(θγ )2
2
[( 1
nγ
)2( 1
p
− 1)‖Vγ (xt ;D)‖22 +
1
np
( σ˜
2
mτ
+ σ2d)]
≤ f (x¯t ;D) −
θγ
2
‖∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22
+
θγ
2
‖ 1
n
∑n
i=1
∇ f (xi,t ;Di ) − ∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22
+
Lθ2
2n2
( 1
p
− 1)‖Vγ (xt ;D)‖22 +
L(θγ )2
2np
( σ˜
2
mτ
+ σ2d)
(a)≤ f (x¯t ;D) − θγ
2
‖∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22
+
θγ
2n
∑n
i=1
‖∇ f (xi,t ;Di ) − ∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22
+
Lθ2
2n2
( 1
p
− 1)‖Vγ (xt ;D)‖22 +
L(θγ )2
2np
( σ˜
2
mτ
+ σ2d)
(b )≤ f (x¯t ;D) −
θγ
2
‖∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 +
θγL
2n
‖xt − x¯t ‖22
+
Lθ2
2n2
( 1
p
− 1)‖Vγ (xt ;D)‖22 +
L(θγ )2
2np
( σ˜
2
mτ
+ σ2d) (39)
where (a) is by the Jensen’s inequality, (b) is by the L-Lipschitz
continuous gradient ∇ f (x; ζ ).
Taking full expectation and plugging the result in step 2, we
have:
E[f (x¯t+1 ;D) − f (x¯t ;D)]
≤ E[−θγ
2
‖∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 +
θ3γL
n
t−1∑
s=0
β
2(t−1−s)
θ
( 1
p
− 1)‖∇V (xs ;D)‖2
+
θγLC3
n
( γ
1 − β
)2
+
θ2γ 3LC2
n(1 − β) (
1
p
− 1) + Lθ
2
2n2
( 1
p
− 1)‖Vγ (xt ;D)‖22
+
L(θγ )2
2np
( σ˜
2
mτ
+ σ2d)] (40)
Telescope the above inequality from 1 to T :
T−1∑
t=0
E[θγ
2
‖∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 ]
≤ f (x¯0;D) − E[f (x¯T ;D)] +
θ3γL
n
T−1∑
t=1
t−1∑
s=0
β
2(t−1−s)
θ
( 1
p
− 1)×
E[‖∇V (xs ;D)‖2] +
TθγLC3
n
( γ
1 − β
)2
+
Tθ2γ 3LC2
n(1 − β) (
1
p
− 1)
+
T−1∑
t=0
Lθ2
2n2
( 1
p
− 1)E‖Vγ (xt ;D)‖22 +
LT (θγ )2
2np
( σ˜
2
mτ
+ σ2d)
(a)≤ f (0;D) − f (x∗D ;D) +
θ3γL
n
T−2∑
s=0
T−1∑
t=s+1
β
2(t−1−s)
θ
( 1
p
− 1)×
E[‖∇V (xs ;D)‖2] +
TθγLC3
n
( γ
1 − β
)2
+
Tθ2γ 3LC2
n(1 − β) (
1
p
− 1)
+
T−1∑
t=0
Lθ2
2n2
( 1
p
− 1)E‖Vγ (xt ;D)‖22 +
LT (θγ )2
2np
( σ˜
2
mτ
+ σ2d)
≤ f (0;D) − f (x∗D ;D) +
θ3γL
n(1 − β2
θ
)
T−2∑
s=0
( 1
p
− 1)‖∇V (xs ;D)‖2
+
TθγLC3
n
( γ
1 − β
)2
+
Tθ2γ 3LC2
n(1 − β) (
1
p
− 1) +
T−1∑
t=0
Lθ2
2n2
( 1
p
− 1)×
E‖Vγ (xt ;D)‖22 +
LT (θγ )2
2np
( σ˜
2
mτ
+ σ2d)
(b )≤ f (0;D) − f (x∗D ;D) +
θ2γL
n(1 − β)
T−1∑
t=0
( 1
p
− 1)E[‖∇V (xt ;D)‖2]
+
TθγLC3
n
( γ
1 − β
)2
+
Tθ2γ 3LC2
n(1 − β) (
1
p
− 1)
+
T−1∑
t=0
Lθ2
2n2
( 1
p
− 1)E‖Vγ (xt ;D)‖22 +
LT (θγ )2
2np
( σ˜
2
mτ
+ σ2d)
≤ f (0;D) − f (x∗D ;D) + (
θ2γL
n(1 − β) +
Lθ2
2n2
)( 1
p
− 1)×
T−1∑
t=0
E[‖∇V (xt ;D)‖2] +
TθγLC3
n
( γ
1 − β
)2
+
Tθ2γ 3LC2
n(1 − β) (
1
p
− 1) + LT (θγ )
2
2np
( σ˜
2
mτ
+ σ2d)
(c)≤ f (0;D) − f (x∗D ;D) +
TθγLC3
n
( γ
1 − β
)2
+
Tθ2γ 3LC2
n(1 − β) (
1
p
− 1)
+
LT (θγ )2
2np
( σ˜
2
mτ
+ σ2d) + ( θ
2γL
n(1 − β) +
Lθ2
2n2
)( 1
p
− 1)×( 2pnγC1(
2pθ − (1 − λn + γL)θ2
) + (1 − λn + γL)θγ 2TC2
2p − (1 − λn + γL)θ
)
(41)
where (a) is by E[f (x¯T );D] ≥ f (x∗D ;D) and Fubini’s theorem, (b)
is by βθ ∈ (0, 1) and Lemma 6 and (c) is from step 1. Hence,
T−1∑
t=0
‖∇ f (x¯t ;D)‖22 ≤
2C1
θγ
+
2TLC3
n
( γ
1 − β
)2
+
2Tθγ 2LC2
n(1 − β) (
1
p
− 1)
+
LTθγ
n2p
C2 + ( 2θγL
n(1 − β) +
Lθ
n2
)( 1
p
− 1)
( 2pnC1(
2pθ − (1 − λn + γL)θ2
)
+
(1 − λn + γL)θγTC2
2p − (1 − λn + γL)θ
)
(42)
where C1 = f (0;D) − f (x∗D ;D), C2 = nσ˜2/mτ + ndσ2 and C3 =
(nG)2 + (ndσ )2 are constants. 
A.4 Proof of Corollary 3
Proof. By setting θ = min{p/(1 − λn + γL),p/2} ≤ 1, we have
(1 − λn + γL)θ = min{p,p(1 − λn + γL)/2} ≤ p (43)
1/θ = max{(1 − λn + γL)/p, 2/p}
(a)≤ 3/p (44)
where (a) is by 1 − λn + γL ≤ 3 with a very small γ (i.e. large
enough T ). Thus for (I) in (7), 2C1/θγT ≤ 6C1/γTp = O(1/γTp);
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(II) is O
(
nγ 2/(1 − β)2) ; for (III) is
2θγ 2LC2
n(1 − β) (
1
p
− 1) + LθγC2
n2p
≤ γ
2LC2
n(1 − β) +
LγC2
2n2
=O
( γ 2
(1 − β) +
γ
n
)
;
(45)
and (IV) is
( 2γ L
n(1−β ) +
L
n2
)( 1
p
−1)
( 2pnC1(
2p − (1 − λn + γ L)θ
)
T
+
(1−λn+γ L)θ 2γC2
2p−(1−λn+γ L)θ
)
≤ ( 2γ L
n(1 − β ) +
L
n2
)
( 2nC1
Tp
+ 2γC2
)
= O
(( γ
1 − β +
1
n
)( 1
Tp
+ 2γ )) (46)
To summarize, the convergence error has the order:
O
( 1
γTp
+
nγ 2
(1 − β)2 +
γ 2
(1 − β) +
γ
n
+ ( γ
1 − β +
1
n
)( 1
Tp
+ 2γ )
)
= O
( 1
γTp
+
nγ 2
(1 − β)2 +
γ 2
(1 − β) +
γ
n
+
γ
(1 − β)Tp +
1
nTp
)
= O
( 1
γTp
+
nγ 2
(1 − β)2 +
γ
n
+
γ
(1 − β)Tp +
1
nTp
)
(47)
Set γ = c
√
n log(T )/T , then order of the convergence error is:
O
( 1√
n log(T )Tp
+
n2 log(T )
(1 − β )2Tp +
√
log(T )
nT
+
√
n log(T )
(1 − β )
√
(Tp)3
+
1
nTp
)
.
(48)
With the large iteration number, i.e.T /log(T )4 > n5/(1−β)4, then
the order of the convergence error is bounded by:
O
( 1√
nT
+
√
log(T )
nT
+
log(T )
nT
)
= O
(√ log(T )
nT
)
. (49)

